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Abstract
In this Online Appendix, we discuss in detail several extensions to the model de-
scribed in the body of the text, and their implications.
1 Naive Agents
In the literature, when modeling time inconsistent agents, an assumption of naivete is some-
times made in contrast to the sophistication we have assumed throughout the body of the
paper.1 Naive agents have   preferences, but believe that they will have standard geomet-
ric preferences in any future period. Sometimes agents are assumed to be partially naive.
This is modeled as agents having beliefs about their future selves that are intermediate
between full sophistication and full naivete.
Most of our analysis would go through, with some modications, if agents were partially
naive. However, it is useful to comment on the qualitative impact of such agents in the
electorate. To simplify our discussion, suppose that some agents in the population are fully
naive.
In our model naive agents behave like time consistent (high ) individuals in period
1: they do not have any demand for commitment because they are unaware of their time
inconsistency problem. Therefore, the higher the mass of naive agents in the economy,
the lower the investment in commitment in equilibrium. However, once period 2 arrives,
these agents are tempted by immediate consumption, lowering the e¤ective pivotal  in the
centralized consumption scenario. Overall, the presence of these naive agents reduces welfare
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for the sophisticated agents. However, the naive agents make worseindividual choices than
sophisticated agents so they are more likely to benet from centralization. If the naive agents
constitute a majority and the median  in the second period is such that  < v2
v3
, then full
decentralization is best: the political outcomes of any centralized decisions would be bad so
decentralization would at least deliver good choices for the relatively high ; sophisticated
agents.
If the naive agents are a minority, then there are opposing forces in favor and against
centralization: the presence of the naive agents worsens the choices but the naive agents
benet more from centralization.2
2 Commitment Subsidies
Instead of considering a centralized commitment scenario where the elected government
chooses the amount of commitment in period 1, one could consider a scenario where can-
didates propose subsidies to commitment. If a voter receives a subsidy s, the choice of
commitment in period 1 can be obtained by maximizing
U1 (x (c; ) ; c; ; s) = v3 + x (c; ) (v2   v3)  k (x (c; ) ; c)  I (c; s)
where @I(c;s)
@c
is decreasing in s. Thus, the amount of commitment chosen by each individual
is increasing in s. However, the voting decision between two candidates who o¤er di¤erent
levels of subsidies needs to take into account the budgetary impact of the subsidies and how
the corresponding expenses are distributed in the population. The total amount of subsidies
depends on the aggregate amount of commitment. Consider then a setting in which subsidies
are chosen collectively, and consumption is chosen in a decentralized fashion. If the burden
is shared equally across the electorate,3 it can be shown that the pivotal agent remains that
with a preference parameter CD (the pivotal agent in our baseline centralized commitment-
decentralized consumption setting absent subsidies). If this agent invests relatively little in
commitment, the value of subsidies for her is lower than her contribution to the collective pool
2Hiedhues and Koszegi (2010) suggested how commitment policieis in the credit card market might
be benecial for naive consumers from a welfare perspective. In our setting, whenever choices are made
collectively, there are additional forces due to externalities, which alters the calculus of political inuence.
3Formally, for any prole of commitment c(), the overall budgetary consequence of a subsidy level s is
given by: Z 1
0
I(c(); s)dG() 
Z 1
0
I(c())dG();
which is shared equally within the population.
2
covering overall subsidies in the population. In this case, the outcome of the election would
generate zero subsidies. On the other hand, if this agent has a relatively high investment
in commitment, so that she is a net beneciary of the subsidies, she will support fairly
high subsidies. In this case, the outcome would lead to higher investment in commitment
by all agents relative to that chosen under the fully decentralized scenario. Note, however,
that from the perspective of period 1, commitment subsidies generate lower welfare than a
laissez-faire economy.
3 Supplementing Commitment
Another natural extension pertains to agentspotential ability to supplement commitment
investments that are chosen by the government.
Suppose public and private commitments are governed by the same technology. That is,
for any government choice of commitment cg; each agent experiences a period 1 cost of I(cg),
while additional private commitment of cp leads the agent to experience an overall period 1
cost of I(cg + cp): That is, the cost of supplementing public investment in commitment is
incremental. Our equilibrium characterization changes only in the centralized commitment,
decentralized consumption setting. Since commitment costs are convex, the governments
commitment technology is not inferior to the private technology, and the amount of commit-
ment chosen by the government is given by our Proposition 1. Individuals who seek greater
commitment will then supplement the collective commitment privately. From a welfare per-
spective, this setting still generates lower welfare levels than the fully decentralized one as
agents can emulate the generated outcomes privately.
Suppose instead that public and private commitment technologies are independent, so
that a choice of government commitment cg and private commitment cp generate a period 1
cost of Ig(cg)+Ip(cp); where Ig and Ip satisfy our assumptions on the underlying commitment
technology that were made in Section 3. In this case, when commitment is subject to collec-
tive action agents will typically mix private and public investment. The precise formulation
of the equilibrium characterization in the relevant two settings depends more intricately on
the functional forms of our model. In such settings, centralizing commitment alone may
be benecial relative to full decentralization as that setting e¤ectively provides individuals
access to an aggregate commitment cost technology that is more e¢ cient: individuals can
smooth the cost of commitment by splitting their commitment investments between public
and private ones.
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4 Endogenous Turnout
There are fewmodels of endogenous turnout when the alternatives are themselves endogenous
and determined via campaign competition. One obstacle is that most models of this sort
have an inherent implausibility when candidate positions converge (as in many models of
campaign competition), there is absolutely no reason for voters to turn out in equilibrium
regardless of the assumption about votersparticipation motives, be it selsh, expressive, or
ethical.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to consider how the forces in our model are modied by
the presence of endogenous turnout. To this end, we use the model of Ledyard (1984), who
studies equilibrium candidate platforms in a spatial model in which candidates are o¢ ce
motivated, and voters have i.i.d. draws of costs of participation, independent of their policy
preferences. The main result in Ledyard (1984) is that, in equilibrium, candidates converge
to the position that maximizes the utilitarian surplus of voters, and no voters turn out.
The result is driven by the fact that, should a candidate deviate, more extreme voters would
have a higher incentive to participate, leading to preference intensity being incorporated into
candidatesobjectives. This model can be immediately adapted to our environment. For
any given distribution G of voterspresent bias parameters, the equilibrium can therefore
easily be computed and compared to the case of exogenous turnout that we have studied so
far.
Let us rst consider what happens if only commitment is centralized. The equilibrium
level of commitment with endogenous turnout will maximize voterssurplus given the subse-
quent choices of consumption induced in period 2. Whether this level is higher or lower than
the equilibrium choice with exogenous turnout depends on the distribution of preferences.
Similarly, full centralization will lead to the choice of commitment and subsequent choice
of consumption that maximize voterssurplus, and, again, these choices may be lower or
higher than the one preferred by the median voter that results under exogenous turnout. Of
course, under endogenous turnout, full centralization becomes much more appealing from a
welfare perspective.
5 Linear Commitment Costs and Single-Peaked Pref-
erences
Throughout the paper, we have often assumed that @k(1;c)
@x
> v2. In that case, individual
preferences for commitment are single peaked. When preferences are not single peaked, our
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analysis needs to be modied, especially for the case of centralized commitment-decentralized
consumption.
We will now outline what happens when preferences are not single peaked by considering
the special case of linear costs (and dropping the requirement that @k(x;0)
@x
= 0). This case
is useful since its structure is particularly simple. We rst emphasize that the main welfare
results still hold in this case. However, the equilibrium construction is more complex.
When consumption costs are linear, we can normalize parameters so that k (x; c) = cx.
Furthermore, the optimal choice in the second period is generically either x = 0 or x = 1.
In case of indi¤erence, we will assume that an agent breaks the indi¤erence to favor her
commitment self,i.e., she chooses x = 0.4
Suppose that in period 1 a cost c was chosen, and consider the period 2 choice problem
of a voter of type . She will consume in period 3 if and only if
U2 = v2   c  v3. (1)
Thus, as before, agents with  > v2
v3
are not willing to pay for commitment: they do not
nd it necessary.
Commitment is perceived benecial in period 1 if the delay in consumption due to com-
mitment is worth its costs I(c): That is, whenever there is a commitment parameter c such
that:
v3   I (c)  v2 ()  (v3   v2)  I (c) : (2)
How do investment incentives now vary with ? It is very di¢ cult (and costly) to make
low  agents wait until period 3 to consume. On the other side of the spectrum, high  agents
are virtuous and will wait till period 3 even with no commitment instruments. Therefore,
investment only pays for intermediate s.
Thus, as in the case studied previously, incentives to invest are not monotonic in 
since both low- and high- agents dislike investment (for di¤erent reasons). However, unlike
the previous case, utilities are not single peaked with respect to the commitment c: for
intermediate s payo¤s are rst decreasing in c because we violate condition (1) and so
commitment initially a¤ects utility only through its costs, but carries no benets in terms
4This setting can t a special case of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, 2004, 2007) type of preferences. Namely,
suppose that two functions govern an individuals utility from consumption: u(x) is the direct utility of x;
while v(y) is the temptation cost of not having consumed y available at the time of choice. In such a setting,
in order to delay consumption in period 2; u (v3)  v (v2)  u (v2) : Suppose u(x) = x and v(y) = y; where
 > 0: Then delayed consumption in period 3 occurs when v3  v2(1 + ); which is analogous to our linear
costs case when taking  = 11+ :
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of the timing of consumption, until we reach a level of commitment c such that condition
(1) is satised, so that c = 0 and c = c are both local optima.
Consider now the case of collective commitment accompanied by decentralized choice.
For all agents of preference parameter   v2
v3
, there is no willingness to pay for commitment
no matter what the commitment technology is. Recall that  = v2
v3
. If 1   G()  1=2;
there is a majority supporting no commitment and, as before, there is a unique equilibrium
in which both candidates o¤er commitment cCD = 0: Suppose there is a substantial fraction
of the population that is moderate, 1 G() < 1=2: Now note that by raising c we obtain
an increasing mass of 0s for which v3  v2   c. Let  (c)  v2 cv3 . The mass is given by
G ( (c)). Dene cL such that
G () G ( (cL)) = 1
2
and let L   (cL).
Let ~c be the unique commitment level such that5
 (~c) (v3   v2) = I (~c) :
The next result characterizes the equilibria in this environment.
Proposition 1 Assume that k (x; c) = cx. When only commitment decisions are centralized,
1. If L (v3   v2)  I (cL), there exists a unique equilibrium with investment of zero in
commitment instruments.
2. If L (v3   v2) > I (cL), there is no pure strategy equilibrium. In this case, there is a
continuum of equilibria in mixed strategies. All symmetric proles having a two-point
support c1 < c2 with equal probability on c1 and c2, where c2 2 [cL; ~c], constitute part
of an equilibrium.
The intuition for the non existence of positive commitment, pure strategy equilibria is
the following. Assume c > 0 is part of an equilibrium. A deviation to a slightly lower
commitment level attracts votes from two groups of voters: all agents with (low) 0s such
that c is not su¢ cient to generate delay and so a lower c is preferable, and all agents with
(high) 0s such that c is more than enough. Thus, support for the deviating candidate is
overwhelming, with the extremes squeezingthe middle. Zero commitment is an equilibrium
5Note that (~c)(v3 v2) is decreasing in ~c: Since (0)(v3 v2) > I(0) = 0 and 0 = (v2)(v3 v2) < I(v2);
the existence of a unique ~c 2 (0; v2) satisfying the equality is guaranteed.
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if the commitment technology is not too e¢ cient. If, however, investment is very cheap
(I (c) is very low), then zero commitment cannot be an equilibrium because a global
deviation to a large commitment would attract a majority of support. The proposition
describes the mixed strategy equilibria in this case.
When only consumption choices are mandated (but commitment is chosen individually),
the same analysis as in the general case holds and equilibrium is characterized by the entire
electorate choosing not to invest in commitment.
Consider, last, the case in which both commitment and choices are mandated. Incentives
to vote for investment in the rst period may be high for high- individuals. The optimal
commitment parameter c is either 0 or the c that is just su¢ cient to make the median-
individual choose consumption at period 3; i.e., the minimal level of cost that solves
v2   c  Mv3 or c = max fv2   Mv3; 0g :
In period 1, all voters such that  (v3   v2)  I (c) or equivalently such that   I(c)(v3 v2)
prefer c to 0; all agents with lower s prefer 0. Thus, there can be a broad consensus in
favor of investing.
Proposition 2 Suppose k (x; c) = cx: When both commitment and consumption decisions
are centralized, there exist ; ^ such that if M   or M  ^; there is a unique equilibrium
with c = 0; and if M 2

; ^

; there is an equilibrium with positive commitment.
Now that we have characterized equilibria in this environment, it can easily be seen that
the main forces behind our welfare results from Section 6 in the body of the paper are still in
place: either full centralization or full decentralization are best, and the comparison between
these two institutions depends on how virtuous the median voter is. In fact, the proof of
Proposition 6 remains intact.
6 Proof of Proposition 1
We rst show that with linear costs there is no pure strategy equilibrium with positive com-
mitment. Assume by way of contradiction that candidate 1 chooses c > 0 with probability
1. Then candidate 2 can win with probability 1 by choosing c  " for " su¢ ciently small. All
voters with preference parameter  such that v3  v2   (c  ") prefer candidate 2 because
they still get to consume in period 3 but the lower investment in commitment is su¢ cient
to do so. Furthermore, all voters with  such v3 < v2   c prefer candidate 2 because they
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consume in period 2 with both levels of commitment, so prefer the candidate who o¤ers the
lower level. The only voters who may prefer c over c " are those whose preference parameter
 is such that v3  v2   c and v3 < v2   (c  "). However, because the distribution G
is continuous, the mass of these voters can be made arbitrarily small by choosing " small
enough.
If L (v3   v2)  I (cL), then all agents with preference parameter  such that   L
prefer c = 0 to cL. Since I (c) is convex, they prefer c = 0 to all c > cL. Furthermore, any
0 < c < cL is also worse than c = 0 for these agents because v3 < v2   c by the denition
of cL and L. Since (1 G ()) +G (L) = 12 , there is a majority in favor of c = 0 against
all other cs.
If L (v3   v2) > I (cL), then all s between  and L strictly prefer cL + " to c = 0.
Furthermore, some s slightly higher than L also prefer cL + " to c = 0. Since there half
the mass of voters is concentrated between L and 
, cL+" defeats c = 0. As shown above,
there is no pure strategy equilibrium with positive commitment. This establishes that when
L (v3   v2) > I (cL), there is no pure strategy equilibrium.
We now show that when L (v3   v2) > I (cL) the mixed-strategy proles in the statement
of the proposition constitute equilibria. Note rst that c1 and c2 as dened in the proposition
tie. Consider now a policy c^ > c2. This policy may win against c1. However, c^ loses against
c2 because all agents of preference parameter  > (c2)    (for some ) would vote for c2
over c^. Since G((c1))   G((c2)) = 12 , there is more than 50% of the voters supporting
c2. Thus, c^ wins with probability 1=2. Consider now a policy c1 < c^ < c2. Such a policy
may win against c2. However, against c1; the only potential supporters are agents with
preference parameters within [(c^); (c1)); which by construction entails less than 50% of
the population. In particular, cL is a policy that would lose against c1: Last, consider a policy
c^ < c1: This policy may win against c1: Against c2; its only potential supporters are agents
with preference parameters   (c2) or   (c^); which from the denition of the pair
(c1; c2) account for less than 50% of the voters. Thus, the candidate equilibrium strategy
prole wins with probability at least 1=2 against all possible deviations and no deviation is
strictly benecial. 
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